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6Confucianism and Democracy
Sor-hoon Tan
Is Confucianism democratic or antidemocratic? Could Confucianism and 
democracy at least coexist in a society? Could there be more than coexistence: 
positive mutual transformation that brings the two closer or even eff ects a 
fruitful merger? Th ese are questions of importance beyond the ivory tower. 
Th ey have consequences for the future of many societies in East Asia, and the 
relationship between East Asian societies and other societies in a globalizing 
era. Th is chapter will begin with a brief introduction to the wide and growing 
range of literature on the relationship between Confucianism and democracy 
by highlighting and comparing some major positions. It then advocates a 
Confucian democracy by reconstructing, in the sense of a transformative 
understanding that renders past meanings relevant to the future, some key 
aspects of Confucianism.
Confucianism and Democracy Are Incompatible
Chen Duxiu, one of the standard bearers of the New Culture movement in 
Republican China, argued in 1916 that Confucian thought and teachings 
belonged to the feudal age: its “objectives, ethics, social norms, mode of living, 
and political institutions did not go beyond the privilege and prestige of a 
few rulers and aristocrats and had nothing to do with the happiness of the 
great masses.”1 Many Chinese intellectuals of the time believed that China’s 
Confucian heritage was holding back China’s modernization, especially its 
pursuit of democracy. From the early twentieth century, liberal-minded 
Korean intellectuals also saw Confucianism as conservative and backward, 
and attacked it for obstructing modernization, and minjung scholars opposing 
103
SP_CHA_Ch06_103-120.indd   103 2/24/10   6:18:18 AM
104 Sor-hoon Tan
the authoritarian regimes of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan also 
regarded Confucianism as an obstacle to the realization of democracy and 
social justice in South Korea.2
Lucian Pye argued that Confucian political culture was authoritarian 
and an obstacle to democratization in Asia, while Samuel Huntington saw 
Confucianism and democracy as a “contradiction in terms.”3 Huntington 
predicted a “clash of civilization” between the illiberal antidemocratic Islam 
and Confucianism on the one side and Western liberal democracy on the 
other. Likewise, some Asians have argued that the values of liberal democracy 
are incompatible with the Confucian culture of their societies, and they have 
brought forth Asian values to challenge Western models in the international 
discourse on human rights.
We need to separate what are merely politically opportunistic positions 
from serious refl ection on the issues. Asian societies have a right to choose or 
fi nd their own paths, and their specifi c historical and cultural circumstances 
may allow and even require them to shape their futures diff erently from 
other societies. Even if the price is a loss of democracy, societies with a long 
historical legacy of Confucian infl uence may not be better off  if that infl uence 
is completely destroyed, assuming that it is possible to do so. Even Western 
scholars are not unanimous in their praise of liberal democratic values. Th ose 
who maintain that the values of Confucianism and liberal democracy are 
inherently incompatible may still believe that they can coexist as “independent 
value systems” in the same society. Chenyang Li, for example, argues for 
coexistence of both sets of values, despite their inherent incompatibility, in 
China’s future.4
Confucianism and Democracy Are Compatible
Asians are also divided about the desirability and validity of liberal democratic 
values. Among those in favor of liberal democracy, not all believe that it must 
come at the expense of their Confucian legacy. One could argue that the two 
most Confucian societies in Asia, Taiwan and South Korea, rank among the 
most democratic. Kwon Tai-Hwan and Cho Hein’s study of the historical 
basis of Korean democratization concluded that the Confucian residuals 
played a dual role in the recent democratization process, and predicted that 
“in the long run, the Confucian legacy may play an increasingly positive 
role in the democratization of Korea” through mutual adjustments in the 
interface between Confucian and western ideals.5 Japan, which had its share of 
Confucian infl uence, is one of the oldest and most stable Asian democracies. 
However, skeptics might respond that these countries have democratized 
despite Confucianism—in becoming democratic, they become less Confucian. 
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A strong argument for Confucian democracy would require showing that 
Confucian values, institutions, and practices are or can be democratic, or at 
least need not be contradictory to democracy.
Th e national confi dence brought by economic successes of East Asian 
societies from the 1970s has led to renewed positive interest in their cultural 
heritage. Confucianism has been credited with the economic boom of the 
Asian tigers and featured prominently in discussions about the Asian model 
of development. Even in the People’s Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping’s 
reforms allowed a reevaluation of Confucianism, which turned to democratic 
reconstruction by the mid-eighties. Earlier, Chinese scholars such as Carsun 
Chang, Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan, and Mou Zongsan advocated “a reconstruction 
of Chinese culture” that would include reconciling its Confucian heritage 
with modern democratic aspirations.6 Prominent Confucian scholars such 
as Wm. Th eodore de Bary and Tu Wei-ming, have devoted their careers to 
showing that Confucian philosophy is humanistic and liberal, even though 
political institutions and practices in Confucian societies historically may have 
been authoritarian. Th e less optimistic, Liu Shu-hsien among them, see the 
compatibility of Confucianism and democracy as requiring signifi cant sacrifi ces 
on the part of Confucianism, but without destroying it altogether.
Denying Essentialism and Democratizing Confucianism
Those who maintain that Confucianism and democracy are inherently 
incompatible usually adopt the liberal conception of democracy and interpret 
Confucianism as essentially collectivistic, patriarchal, and authoritarian. 
However, democracy is a contested concept in Western philosophical 
discourses, just as Confucianism is not a homogeneous tradition. Th ose 
who believe that Confucianism has no place for liberal individual autonomy 
may nevertheless see Confucianism as compatible with a democracy that 
adopts a social conception of the individual, such as that found in John 
Dewey’s philosophy. Roger Ames and David Hall have argued that Dewey’s 
“communitarian” conception of democracy is the best bridge between China’s 
Confucian civilization and a democratic future. My earlier work includes an 
attempt at a Deweyan reconstruction of both Confucianism and democracy 
for a Confucian democracy.
Th e position I shall advocate adopts an antiessentialist hermeneutical 
stance. In my view, Confucianism does not have an unchanging essence; 
it lies in the meaningful continuity of a tradition of scholarship and social 
practice, wherein discourses about ideals and norms relate to actual practice in 
dynamic tension. Even if we grant that Confucianism might not be recognizable 
without values such as emphasis on the family, fi lial morality, loyalty, and 
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respecting tradition, what these values mean and how they are actualized 
could change over time and space. In any case, not everyone agrees that these 
values represent what is most valuable to Confucianism; they could be seen 
as variously derived from the primary notions of ren 仁, yi 義, li 禮, and zhi 
知 in contingent social contexts. Th e Confucian tradition is not homogeneous 
in content; instead, it is constituted by the continuity of interpretive practice 
focusing on certain core texts (the inclusion and exclusion of which is also 
contested). Th e reconciliation of Confucianism and democracy I shall attempt 
in this chapter will focus on what I consider the most important of these 
texts, the Analects.7
Deweyan Conception of Democracy
Th ere are many diff erent conceptions of democracy. Democracy could be 
seen as nothing more than a political system wherein governments are elected 
for limited terms by universal suff rage. Some argue that popularly elected 
governments will become mob rule without the rule of law and universal rights 
limiting government and protecting individual autonomy. Some emphasize 
the values of liberty and equality, with diff erent weightings between them. 
Others insist on the need for more comprehensive citizen participation at 
various levels of the polity, shared values nurturing community life, and 
civic virtues. Th e limited space of this chapter does not allow an extensive 
exploration of the pros and cons of various conceptions. I shall merely set 
out the basic outline of John Dewey’s conception, which will be adopted for 
my purpose here.
In Dewey’s view, democracy is not just a political system of selecting and 
regulating government; it is an ethical and social ideal. Democracy represents 
the complete and perfect community. Th is idea (also ideal) of community is 
conceived by extracting the desirable characteristics or forms of community 
life that has actually existed, and using them to criticize undesirable features 
and suggest improvement; the ideal is the fi nal limit of all desirable traits and 
tendencies of community life. Dewey came up with two criteria for existing 
community life: (1) How numerous and varied are the interests that are 
consciously shared? (2) How full and free is the interplay with other forms of 
association? Democracy optimizes both criteria.8 For Dewey, democracy is the 
only method by which human beings can succeed in “the greatest experiment 
of humanity—that of living together in ways in which the life of each of us is 
profi table in the deepest sense of the word, profi table both to a single person 
and helpful in the building up of the individuality of others.”9
Rearranging the battle cry of the French Revolution, Dewey placed 
fraternity before liberty and equality, and insists that all three are meaningless 
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outside communal life. Liberty as a democratic ideal is understood as “the 
power to secure release and fulfi llment of personal potentialities which take 
place only in rich and manifold association with others,” and equality is “the 
unhampered share which individual member of the community has in the 
consequences of associated action.”10 Freedom and equality thus understood 
are important in communication, which is critical to creating and sustaining 
community. In a community, individual members “hold things in common.” 
For Dewey, this does not mean that they are clones with homogeneous beliefs 
and interests, nor does it mean that some “shared values” with mysterious 
sources should be imposed on them. Rather, what is held in common is 
achieved over time through communication among those who come together 
to form a community.
As an idea of community, democracy does not deny importance to the 
individual. Dewey considers democracy “a personal, an individual, way of life.” 
“Th e cause of democracy is the moral cause of the dignity and worth of the 
individual.” Th e “idea of democracy as opposed to any conception of aristocracy 
is that every individual must be consulted in such a way, actively not passively, 
that he himself becomes a part of the process of authority, of the process of 
social control; that his needs and wants have a chance to be registered in a way 
where they count in determining social policy.”11 Democracy is participative. 
Democratic politics is constituted by the organization of publics, which are 
comprised of individuals who are aff ected by transactions that they are not 
part of, and who therefore share an interest in controlling those transactions. 
A democratic public does not organize itself by electing offi  cials through a 
simple majority vote and leaving them to speak for those they represent, nor 
is democratic government a matter of following “public opinion” in the sense 
of an aggregate of the arbitrarily formed views of the majority (or worse, views 
manipulated by special interests). A public organizes itself democratically 
through social inquiry, where effi  cacious communication allows every member 
the opportunity to change his or her mind aft er thinking through the issue 
with other participants in the inquiry. A member of a democracy not only 
has a right, but a duty to participate in social inquiry.12
Ren: Confucian Personal Cultivation
and the Making of Community
Th e list of Confucian virtues begins with ren 仁, translated variously as 
benevolence (Lau), humanity (Wing-tsit Chan), authoritative person or conduct 
(Ames and Rosemont), or goodness (Watson). Th e centrality of this concept is 
clear from the frequency of its appearance in the Analects. Confucian scholars 
through the ages have reaffi  rmed its importance in individual treatises as well 
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as the commentaries on the classics. In recent times, Wing-tsit Chan singled 
out ren as the general virtue that encompasses all other Confucian virtues.13 
For Confucius, a person who is not ren could not have anything to do with li 
禮 (ritual) and music, which he values very highly (Analects 3.3). Ren unites 
Confucian personal cultivation and community making. It will provide us 
with an understanding of the Confucian idea of community. By examining 
this idea, we may ask if Confucian community is antidemocratic in the sense 
that its members are denied self-government either over their respective lives 
individually or over the collective.
Confucius taught his students to become exemplary persons (junzi 君
子). One who abandons ren does not deserve the name of junzi (Analects 
4.5). Ren is more valuable than life (Analects 15.9) because it constitutes true 
humanity. To be human is to be related to others. As in Dewey’s philosophy, 
the Confucian conception of the self is social. Peter Boodberg suggests that 
ren is best translated as “co-humanity.” Tu Wei-ming elaborates the script 
as “man in society.”14 Personal cultivation, as a process of realizing one’s 
humanity, achieves ren through extending and improving one’s relationship 
with signifi cant others. It begins in the family, where one learns to be a fi lial 
son and to be brotherly (Analects 1.2), extends to the friendships one enters 
into with others outside the family, leads to one’s contribution to sociopolitical 
order, and ultimately enables a spiritual unity with the cosmos.
Th e process of personal cultivation is at the same time a process of 
creating community. Th e “method of ren” is to “establish others in seeking to 
establish themselves and to promote others in seeking to get there themselves.”15 
Th is is remarkably close to Dewey’s idea of democracy as the method for “living 
together in ways in which the life of each of us is . . . profi table to himself 
and helpful in the building up of the individuality of others.” Th e answers 
Confucius gave to the question, “What is ren?” include “Do not impose upon 
others what you yourself do not want” and “loving others.”16 Th us, Confucian 
community is sustained by members consciously sharing numerous and 
varied interests. Constituted by members’ ever-expanding relational network, 
the boundaries of Confucian communities are fl uid enough to allow each 
community full and free interplay with other communities. Th e Confucian 
idea of community is compatible with Dewey’s conception of democracy as 
it also optimizes Dewey’s two criteria of community life.
When Confucius’s favorite student Yan Hui, whom Confucius praised 
for being more accomplished in ren than any other students (Analects 6.7), 
asked about ren, Confucius replied, “Th rough self-discipline and observing 
ritual propriety one becomes ren” (keji fuli weiren 克己复禮为仁).17 D. C. Lau 
translates keji fuli 克己复禮 as “return to the observance of the rites through 
overcoming the self.”18 Does this imply a subordination of the individual to the 
collective? Without assuming a self that is an ego existing prior and separate 
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from relation with others (a conception contrary to Confucian conception of 
self), we need to answer this question by considering the self-transformation 
that takes place in the process: is it one of growth or one of oppressed 
individuality?
Th e Chinese language uses two terms for “self,” zi 自 and ji 己. Zi is 
used to express refl exivity. When an act in some other contexts may involve 
more than one person, zi indicates that the speaker is both the source (a 
related meaning of zi is “from”) and the object of the act.19 Ji indicates not only 
refl exivity, although that is certainly involved, but also emphasizes a contrast 
with others—I/me rather than others. Th is is not necessarily reprehensible, 
as Confucius himself says that learning should be for oneself (ji) rather than 
others (Analects 14.24). In the Xunzi, Confucius is said to grade “self-love” 
(ziai 自爱) above “causing others to love oneself ” (shiren aiji 使人爱己) and 
“loving others” (airen 爱人) as the answer to the question, “What is ren?”20 
In contrasting oneself (ji) with another, one is drawing a boundary, however 
transitory.21 Th e superiority of ziai lies in achieving a situation where self 
and others are not divided and opposed, so that loving oneself is at the same 
time loving others. It is the self-love of one who has attained the greater self 
constituted by ren. In the context of personal cultivation and achieving ren, 
ji is the less developed self with more rigid boundaries. Boundaries need to 
become fl uid for growth to take place, for one’s relational network to expand, 
for one to share others’ concern.
In other words, one overcomes the self or exercises self-discipline (keji 
克己) when one de-emphasizes the boundaries between oneself and others, 
and gives one’s own and others’ concerns as much weight as is appropriate 
to the situation. Th e explication of ren as “overcoming the self ” does not 
imply oppression of individuality; it off ers a reconciliation of community with 
individuality so that individual growth enhances the growth of community and 
vice versa. “Overcoming the self ” or “self-discipline” could also be understood 
as self-government. At the same time, ren is associated with government of 
others; although everyone should aim to be ren, it is especially valued in rulers. 
Mencius specifi cally advocated ren government. As the virtue of other-directed 
government, it encompasses compassion and care for others. Such compassion 
and care require self-discipline so that one does not give one’s own selfi sh 
interests greater weight than others’ interests. Only sageliness exceeds ren in its 
“broad generosity towards the people and its ability to help the multitude.”22
Confucian Li and Communicative Community
How participatory is Confucian community? While ren may accommodate 
self-government and government over the collective, does it restrict the latter to 
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a select few? Some may argue that, far from advocating democracy, Confucius 
advocated an aristocratic community, albeit he favors rule by an aristocracy 
of virtue instead of any de facto aristocracy. It would be anachronistic to 
attribute the idea of democracy to Confucius. However, even if the concept 
did not exist within the actual Confucius’s intellectual horizons, it does not 
mean that modern readers today cannot understand Th e Analects in ways 
that are compatible with democratic thinking. I shall argue that this could be 
done by understanding Confucian li—variously translated as “rites,” “rituals,” 
“ritual action,” “ceremony,” “propriety,” “decorum,” “manners,” “courtesy,” 
and “civility”—as a system of symbolic action facilitating what could be 
democratic communication, rather than rigid rules of behavior entrenching 
an authoritarian social structure. A community’s li would then constitute a 
form of communication that enables its members to hold and value things 
in common without oppressing individuality.
Th e early script of li, depicting a sacrifi cial vessel, fi rst signifi es religious 
sacrifi ces. Later, the term extended to the modes of conducting religious 
ceremonies, and further to all modes of conduct that were deemed to be proper. 
Li came to be understood as traditional or conventional “rules of conduct.” A. 
S. Cua, who characterizes li as rules of conduct, paraphrases Wittgenstein to 
elucidate such rules: “[R]itual rules, like all rules, stand there like signposts for 
the guidance of our will and action.”23 It is one’s sense of what is appropriate 
for a particular stage of one’s journey that provides guidance as to whether, 
and how, to follow a particular ritual signpost. Although li, as David Nivison 
points out, “are rules that are fl exible and humane,” in actual practice, they 
could degenerate into rigid and oppressive social shackles.24 Treating li as 
universal and immutable rules is contrary to Confucius’s own example of 
refusing to be infl exible or to insist on certainty (Analects 9.4).
Understood as ritual, li belongs to a generic kind of social action, 
similar to greetings, promises, commitments, excuses, pleas, compliments, and 
pacts, that uses symbolic forms to communicate the actors’ intentions and 
expectations, to elicit certain behavior, and generally to make it possible for 
human beings to predict one another’s actions and coordinate them. Rituals 
are embodiments of shared meanings. Th ey guide actions so that better 
coordination can be achieved with less eff ort than would be possible if one 
had to search anew for appropriate ways of interacting in every situation. 
Ritual forms organize social life, enhance effi  ciency of interaction and provide 
continuity and stability. Participants in ritual practice communicate with one 
another, acknowledging their interdependence and reaffi  rming their mutual 
trust and commitment to their shared goal.
Th e communicative capacity of li is the source of social harmony. 
According to Master You, who was said to resemble Confucius, “Achieving 
harmony is the most valuable function of li.”25 Harmony involves diversity 
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rather than homogeneity. According to the Guo Yu, “Th ere is no music 
with one note, no culture with one object, no satisfactory results with one 
fl avor.”26 Th e Zuo Zhuan records an important discourse in which he 和, as 
harmony in the sense of a minister’s views complementing the views of his 
ruler, is distinguished from tong 通, the minister and ruler having identical 
views. It explicates harmony with the metaphor of making broth from various 
ingredients, which is described in the Lüshi chunqiu: “[T]he business of 
mixing and blending must use the sour, the sweet, the bitter, the spicy and the 
salty. Bringing the ingredients together is a very subtle art, each has its own 
expression.”27 A harmonious community does not suppress the individuality 
of its members; instead, it fl ourishes only when individuality and harmony 
enhance each other.
A Confucian community is participatory because successful li requires 
every participant’s personal investment of meaning in the performance, in 
other words, li must be accompanied by yi 義, or appropriateness.28 Li fulfi ls 
its function only when each and every participant is able to appropriate the 
ritual forms and render them meaningful for himself or herself, and thereby 
to communicate effi  caciously and act in harmony with fellow participants. Li 
represents the cultural legacy that transmits meanings created by one generation 
to future generations; yi is each individual’s personal appropriation of this 
legacy and her contribution of novel meaning to it, based on her interaction 
with her particular environment in each specifi c situation. Yi is developed and 
transmitted in li (Analects 15.18). Participants in li come to share meanings 
and norms of appropriateness (yi), which constitute the community’s moral 
values. Th erefore, it is through li that one cultivates oneself: one develops a 
sense of yi, which is the basic disposition of the exemplary person (junzi), 
through li. Th e mutual enhancement of li and yi contributes to ren in both 
personal and communal cultivation.
Although li is not coercive, it is critical to self-discipline, that is, 
self-government. Li provides the forms through which one governs one’s 
own emotions, thoughts, and actions. Th e sense of yi developed in ritual 
participation transforms our ways of feeling and thinking, especially in relation 
to others. Acting contrary to those ways of feeling and thinking engenders 
a sense of shame, which discourages us from transgressing.29 Th is is why 
Confucius believed li to be crucial to sociopolitical order.
Th e Master said, “Lead the people with administrative injunctions 
(zheng) and keep them orderly with penal law (xing), and they 
will avoid punishments but will be without a sense of shame. 
Lead them with excellence (de) and keep them orderly through 
observing ritual propriety (li) and they will develop a sense of 
shame, and moreover will order themselves.”30
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Unfortunately, the governments that have appropriated Confucianism 
through the ages have ignored this important distinction between government 
by li and government by penal law (xing 刑) in coercively imposing a 
ritual order enforced by indoctrination and punishments. Participative 
self-transformation is replaced by coerced compliance. Dynamic and creative 
order that emerges from participative performance is replaced by stagnant 
passivity. Critics of Confucianism have been justifi ably hostile to dogmatic 
Confucian ritual teachings and practice (lijiao 禮教), which Lu Xun famously 
condemned as “cannibalistic” in his Diary of a Mad Man. However, these 
pernicious practices that destroy individuality in the name of community 
should be seen as perversions resulting from a loss of the fl exibility and 
appropriateness that should be part of ideal ritual practice.
Equality and Confucian Diff erentiated Order
If governments should lead with excellence, then those with excellence should 
rule. Does this mean that Confucianism advocates an elitist government, 
a hierarchical social order, contrary to the democratic value of equality? 
Equality, however, does not translate into a “one-size-fi ts-all” kind of extreme 
egalitarianism; even if such a society is possible, its desirability is doubtful. 
Western democratic theory is mainly concerned that only relevant diff erences 
should be allowed to aff ect social distribution and rewards. For example, 
race, gender, age, or lineage should not be allowed to undermine equality 
before the law and equality of opportunity, which are usually considered 
part of democratic society. However, unequal wages are justifi able if the jobs 
require diff erent eff ort and qualifi cations; it would not be undemocratic to 
give limited places in a university to those who perform better in entrance 
exams appropriate to the course of study.
Th e fact that people are treated diff erently need not be contrary to 
democracy. Equality is an essentially contested value in Western thought. 
Dewey’s understanding of equality as “unhampered share in the consequences of 
associations” does not require absolute equality in terms of identical quantities. 
Instead, it allows for functional diff erentiation and quantitatively diff erent 
distribution of resources, and diff erent levels and kinds of participation based 
on diff erent needs and capacities relevant to specifi c situations. I shall try to 
show that Confucian social order is diff erentiated without necessarily being 
hierarchical and that its justifi cation for inequalities is not undemocratic but 
compatible with Dewey’s conception of equality as distribution based on needs 
and capacities contributing to personal-communal growth.
Distinction between superior and inferior, between better and worse, 
diff erent social statuses and unequal power is part of the diff erentiation 
required in a Confucian community. However, inequality need not be so 
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totalistic that if one is superior, one is superior always and in all things; 
it need not be so infl exible that one is born into a fi xed place in a rigid 
social order and must live one’s life as prescribed by one’s position with no 
possibility of change. Inequality and equality in the diff erentiated order of a 
Confucian community are relative rather than absolute. Such a community 
distributes respect, power, goods, and services proportional to the degree each 
individual meets the criteria ethically relevant to what is to be distributed. 
In a Confucian diff erentiated order, there is no permanent elite who enjoys 
more of everything at the expense of the rest of the people.
In Confucius’s view, a good ruler of a state or head of a household “does 
not worry that his people are poor, but that wealth is inequitably distributed 
(bujun).”31 Other translations of bujun 不均 include “inequality,” “ill-appor-
tioned,” and “uneven distribution.” It is highly unlikely that Confucius would 
recommend the same quantity for all, more likely that the shares should be 
proportional to some ethically acceptable criteria. One such criterion is need 
since, “Exemplary persons help out the needy; they do not make the rich 
richer.”32 Th e responsibility of a government is to satisfy its people’s material and 
educational needs (Analects 12.7). Confucius disapproves of the extravagance 
of the powerful at the expense of others (Analects 12.9). He went so far as to 
disown his student Ranyou for adding to the coff ers of the House of Ji, which 
was already richer than the Duke of Zhou (Analects 11.17).
In Confucianism, political participation is justified by abilities. 
Regarding the question, “Who should govern?” Confucius is seen as 
replacing an aristocracy of birth with a meritocracy of ethical achievement. 
Only one with the abilities to discharge the responsibilities of a position 
should be allowed to occupy it (Analects 4.14, 13.2, 15.14). Democratizing 
Confucianism will require recognizing that participation itself is educational. 
Meritocracy is compatible with equality if everyone has a chance of rising 
to the highest offi  ce. If a society historically has been rigidly stratifi ed, the 
language of meritocracy fosters elitist tendencies that, more oft en than not, 
underestimate both the needs and the abilities of those in the lower social 
strata. In contrast, the language of democracy, by nurturing a public ethos 
that explicitly rejects historical social stratifi cations and by requiring that 
any inequalities be justifi ed rather than taking them for granted, is more 
favorable to participation by those from lower social strata. To compensate 
for its pernicious historical associations, Confucian democracy would have 
to be more self-consciously critical of existing inequalities to ensure that only 
those fulfi lling its philosophical ethical standards are permitted; it must also 
avoid going to the opposite extreme of adopting a hostile attitude toward all 
inequalities, even deference to excellence.
For a social order to be diff erentiated rather than hierarchical there 
should be no entrenched social inequalities. Not only must distribution and 
participation be based on needs and abilities, but as needs and abilities change 
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so must the distribution and participation. Any judgment of superior and 
inferior must be specifi c to a situation. It is meaningless to ask if a person 
is superior or inferior without specifying superior and inferior in what? A 
superior business executive may be an inferior parent. Someone superior to you 
in calligraphy now may become inferior later if you improve your skill more 
rapidly than she. Empirically, superiority in one area is sometimes related to 
superiority in other areas. But this should be determined through empirical 
investigation, not asserted as some kind of a priori truth. Moreover, such 
relations are always contingent and subject to change. A person’s superiority 
in a specifi c area justifi es her having more of some resources or goods only if 
such distribution contributes to growth, such as talent in sports and admission 
to a sports college. Th ere is no superiority that justifi es a higher entitlement 
to all resources and goods.
In a Confucian diff erentiated order, the distribution of political power 
and social prestige, though based on merit, is not a reward for abilities. Th e 
more capable does not therefore deserve more. One’s position only entitles 
one to what is required to discharge one’s responsibilities. Ritual forms of 
deference toward those in superior positions, for example, are not simply for 
the superior’s personal gratifi cation, but have the communicative function 
of recognizing the authority of those positions and thereby subjecting the 
occupants to evaluation by making them more visible to others. One would be 
less concerned about how much better one’s boss is if one were not expected 
to show deference. Th e greater the deference shown to an individual, the 
higher the standard she is expected to meet. In terms of material goods, 
those in higher positions are not automatically entitled to more by virtue of 
their position. What is suffi  cient for the people should be suffi  cient for the 
ruler (Analects 12.9).
“From Seventy, I Could Give my Heart-and-Mind Free Rein . . . ”
Besides equality, freedom is also important to a democratic community. Isaiah 
Berlin distinguishes between two concepts of liberty.33 Negative liberty answers 
the question, “What is the area within which the subject—a person or group of 
persons—is or should be left  to do or be what he is able to do or be, without 
interference from other persons?” Positive liberty is concerned with “What, or 
who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to 
do, or be, this rather than that?”34 Although Dewey (who died before Berlin 
published that essay) would not have rejected negative liberty, he would have 
considered it inadequate; his understanding of freedom leans toward positive 
liberty. Dewey understands freedom as “the power to be an individualized 
self making a distinctive contribution and enjoying in its own way the fruits 
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of association.”35 Freedom must be reconciled with the promotion of the 
common good in a democracy. At the same time, it is closely related to a 
person’s growth and intelligence because “[w]hat men actually cherish under 
the name of freedom is that power of varied and fl exible growth, of change 
of disposition and character, that springs from intelligent choice.”36
Scholars have also argued that if there is any concept of liberty in 
Confucian thought, it would be closer to positive liberty. I shall try to show 
what kind of freedom may be found in the teachings of Th e Analects, and 
defend it against Berlin’s criticism of positive liberty. In Th e Analects, we do 
not fi nd any single term that could be translated as “freedom.” However, is 
Confucius not claiming a kind of freedom when he tells us that “from seventy, 
I could give my heart-and-mind [xin 心] free rein without overstepping the 
boundaries?”37 Th is freedom is achieved only aft er a long and arduous process 
of cultivating the person, in which the person or self, far from being fi xed and 
given, changes for the better over time. Th ere is also freedom in “setting his 
heart-and-mind on learning” when he chose and committed himself to the 
path, but relatively less in scope and quality than the freedom he achieved from 
seventy. Freedom is a relative concept for Confucius. As a person successfully 
cultivates himself and grows ethically, his freedom increases.
In his criticism of positive freedom, Berlin identifi es a strand of it as 
“self-abnegation in order to attain independence.”38 To avoid being crushed 
by external constraints, be they laws or accidents of nature, deliberate malice 
of others or unintentional eff ect of their acts and human institutions, one 
liberates oneself from desires that one cannot realize. Th is is the freedom of 
Epictetus who claims that he, a slave, is freer than his master. Th is conception 
of freedom aids authoritarianism by relocating the problem from others 
imposing constraints—whether they are justifi ed—to the agent herself. It 
is only the agent, not the world, who must change if she is to be free. Is 
Confucius’s freedom such a case of “internalizing” external constraints—is 
he a man who grew to love his chains?
Although some later Confucians adopted a repressive attitude toward 
human desires, Confucius does not reject desire totally; rather, he speaks of 
“desiring authoritative conduct” (Analects 7.30). However, he praised one Meng 
Gongchuo for “not desiring.” (Analects 14.12). In the absence of an absolute 
opposition between desires and ethical conduct, what matters is the distinction 
between ethical desires and unethical ones. One should liberate oneself from 
greed, from any kind of excesses in gratifying one’s own physical appetites, 
which is unethical. Avoiding such unethical desires would re-channel one’s 
energy into ethical desires. A closer look at the use of buyu 不欲 or “not 
desiring” in Th e Analects itself substantiates this. Confucius considered Meng 
Gongchuo qualifi ed to be household steward to the Zhao or Wei families 
(Analects 14.11). A greedy man in such a position would easily succumb to 
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corruption or misappropriation. Meng Gongchuo was eminently qualifi ed for 
that post because he was “free from [excessive] desires,” in other words, he was 
not greedy. Another instance where buyu is understood as the lack of greed 
is in the case of Master Jikang, whose family was “richer than the Duke of 
Zhou,” worrying about thieves. Confucius said to him, “If you yourself were 
not so greedy (buyu), the people could not be paid to steal.”39 Master Jikang’s 
greed was at the expense of the people, making them so poor and desperate 
that they resorted to theft .
Confucius’s freedom is not self-abnegation in the sense of getting rid 
of all desires. Contrary to the self-abnegation Berlin criticizes, a Confucian 
liberates herself from some desires not because she cannot realize them, but 
because she should not realize them. In the former, “internalization” takes 
place regardless of the ethical nature of the external constraints. In the latter, 
the ethical or unethical nature of the constraints is of paramount importance 
to one’s action. While it involves evaluating desires and avoiding some in 
favor of others, Confucius’s freedom is not a case of “reducing the area of 
one’s vulnerability” to external factors. Th e “pruning” of desires, instead 
of stultifying oneself, would help one grow better. It is an open question 
whether that reduces or increases one’s vulnerability to the world. Confucius 
does not see the world as completely within one’s control, even if one is a 
sage. It is quite possible to fi nd more of one’s desires frustrated with greater 
positive freedom; being able to follow one’s desires without overstepping the 
boundaries is no guarantee that those desires will be fulfi lled. In a degenerate 
world, when the way does not prevail, it might be easier to gratify unethical 
desires than fulfi ll ethical ones (consider the frustration of Confucius’s desire 
to bring good government to the world).
Th e boundaries that Confucius from seventy no longer overstepped are 
those between ethical and unethical desires. Th ey are the boundaries of the 
Confucian way of ethical living (dao 道). Th e way is not a fi xed standard 
of conduct, a perfectionist ideal. It is something that emerges from one’s 
personal experience, albeit an experience which always involves others with 
whom we interact; it cannot bring ethical success if imposed from without. 
“Becoming authoritative in one’s conduct [that is, personal cultivation] is 
self-originating, how could it originate with others?”40 “It is the person who 
is able to broaden the way, not the way that broadens the person.”41 Such 
“emergence” of the dao requires an organic integration of one’s actions with 
the rest of one’s experience, which precludes coercion as a means. Coercion 
results only in external compliance. One may force another to follow a way, but 
such compliance does not guarantee understanding; the other person cannot 
be coerced into “realizing it” (Analects 8.9). An argument can be made that 
zhi 知 is not merely knowing intellectually, but requires knowing in practice, 
or implies knowing how. It is “to realize” in both senses of “coming to know” 
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and “making real.” Realizing a Confucian way requires integrating it with 
one’s experience through learning and refl ecting. Confucian freedom lies in 
realizing a way, not in merely following one—it cannot be forced.
Democratic Participation and “Realizing the Way”
Th e distinction between “realizing the way” and merely following it is crucial 
in steering Confucianism away from an elitist meritocracy toward democracy. 
It opens up the possibility of asserting the educational nature of participation. 
To realize the way, to know what to do in various situations, one must learn. 
Learning is a social activity, so that the capacity to contribute to political order 
is best developed in political participation. One could reconstruct Confucian 
learning as participation in social inquiry.
Th e Analects is a collection of conversations, questions, and answers 
between Confucius, his students, and others. Th ey are records of social 
inquiries in which everybody participates according to their abilities rather 
than one-directional transmission of knowledge, as witnessed in the reciprocity 
between learning and teaching. Learning is social in the way it is carried out, 
as a cooperative activity involving a group rather than as a solitary endeavor. 
For Confucius, knowledge and wisdom are best gained in community, among 
people who are ren (Analects 4.1). Learning is also social in its consequences. 
Confucian inquiry would aim at the cultivation of persons in community; 
when eff ective, it changes a community through changing its members and 
their relations with one another. Th e wise devote themselves to what is 
appropriate for the people; they contribute to people’s personal cultivation 
by promoting those upright in their conduct to serve as examples to others 
(Analects 6.22, 12.22).
Social inquiry arises when people encounter problems. Contrary to the 
common belief that Confucian education is book learning by rote, Confucius 
teaches his students the importance of learning from the problems encountered 
and not repeating one’s mistakes (Analects 1.8, 9.25, 15.30, 16.9). Puzzling over 
practical problems is what drives learning. As a teacher, Confucius admits that 
there is nothing he could do for someone who is not constantly asking herself, 
“What to do? What to do?” (Analects 15.16). Confucius advocates “learning 
much, selecting out of it what works well, and then following it” (Analects 
7.28). Even his interest in ancient texts is pragmatic: Both the Book of Songs 
and the Books of Rites should be studied because they enable people to interact 
better, and to contribute to the community in various ways (Analects 13.5, 
16.3, 17.9). In learning, as social inquiry, we seek the answers to “What to 
do?” in problematic situations. Finding those answers means knowing our way, 
or realizing the way (zhidao 知道). Just as becoming ren begins with oneself, 
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learning and realizing the way requires personal participation in solving the 
common problems of the community. To realize the way rather than merely 
follow it, there must be democratic participation in social inquiry to solve 
the shared problems of the community.
I have attempted to re-create Confucius’s learning and teaching in 
democratic ways by showing how individuality and community can be 
reconciled, how Confucian li, far from being rigid rules of behavior entrenching 
social hierarchy, enables people to hold things in common and achieve harmony 
through communication, how Confucian meritocracy is compatible with a 
Deweyan conception of equality, how the Confucian way of life is positively 
free through and in its ethical quest, and how realizing the Confucian way 
requires participatory learning. Th is attempt describes what is possible and 
desirable rather than any actual Confucian community. It off ers an idea of 
Confucian democracy that would hopefully guide the actions of those who 
would like to be both Confucian and democratic; the greater achievement would 
be to persuade others that a democratic Confucianism is the best option for 
Confucians in the modern world, and that a Confucian democracy is more 
satisfactory than other kinds of democracy in some ways, at least for societies 
that value their Confucian legacy. Th is is a project for another day.
Suggestions for Further Reading
Sor-hoon Tan (2004), Confucian Democracy: A Deweyan Reconstruction 
has more extensive discussions of a Deweyan reconstruction of Confucian 
Democracy; Roger Ames and David Hall’s (1999), Democracy of the Dead 
also discusses John Dewey’s concept of democracy and Confucianism in 
the context of China’s future. An interesting proposal for “democracy with 
Confucian characteristics” is presented in Daniel A. Bell (2006), Beyond 
Liberal Democracy. A special issue of the Journal of Chinese Philosophy (vol. 
34, no. 2, June 2007) is devoted to the theme of “Democracy and Chinese 
Philosophy” with heavy emphasis on Confucianism. Many people interested 
in the compatibility of democracy and Confucianism are concerned about 
the issues surrounding human rights. Good discussions on this could be 
found in Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel Bell, eds. (1999), East Asian Challenge 
for Human Rights; Wm. Th eodore de Bary (1998), Asian Values and Human 
Rights: de Bary and Tu Weiming, eds. (1998), Confucianism and Human 
Rights. Other examples dealing with the relevance of Confucianism to the 
modern world, including its compatibility with various aspects of democratic 
life include Daniel Bell and Hahm Chaibong, eds. (2003), Confucianism for 
the Modern World.
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